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[Sac. No. 7756. In Bank. Dec. 16, 1966.] 
JOHN P. SHIVELY et al, Petitioners, v. COLEMAN E. 
STEWART, as Hearing Officer, etc., Respondent; 
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Administrative Law-Procedure-Witnesses-Requiring At-
tendance: Production of Evidence.-Gov. Code, § 11511, indi-
cates that the Legislature expressly contemplated the use of 
the subpoena power to secure the attendance of witnesses and 
the production of evidence at hearings of an administrative 
agency. 
[2] Id.-Procedure-Witnesses-DepositiollS.-' In authorizing the 
taking of depositions when a witness will be unable to or 
cannot be compelled to attend the hearing of an administrative 
agency, Gov. Code, § 11511, provides for depositions, not for 
discovery, but to secure evidence for use at the hearing. 
[5] Id. - Procedure - DiscoveIT Proceedings. - The Legislature's 
silence with respect to prehearing discovery in administrative 
proceedings does not mean that it has rejected such discovery. 
Instead it has left to the courts the question whether modern 
concepts of administrative adjudication call for common law· 
rules to permit and regulate the use of the agencies' subpoena 
power to secure prehearing discovery. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, §§ 154, 
155; Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 421. 
licK. Dig. References: [1, 11] Administrative Law, § 103; [2] 
Administrative Law, § 108; [3] Administrative Law, § 78; [4] 
Physicians and Surgeons, § 21; [5-7] Physicians and Surgeons, 
§ 22; [8-10] Administrative Law, § 104; [12] Administrative Law, 
§ 104; Discovery, § 19(1); [13] Discovery, § 14; Physicians and 
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[4] Physicians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Proceed-
ings.-The State Board of Medical Examiners has the resour-
ces of the state at its command to enable it to secure complete 
information and to prepare its case before filing an accusation 
in disciplinary proceedings. (Gov. Code, §§ 11180, 11181.) 
[6] Id.-Susllension and Revocation of Licenses-Nature of Pro. 
ceedings.-A disciplinary proceeding before the State Board of 
Medical Examiners has a punitive character, for the agency 
can prohibit an accused from practicing his profession. 
[6] Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Nature of Pro. 
ceedings.-In a disciplinary proceeding before the State Board 
of Medical Examiners, the agency is the accuser, a party to the 
proceeding, and ultimately makes a decision on the record; its 
concentration of functions calls for procedural safeguards. 
[7] Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Nature of Pro-
ceedings.-In a disciplinary proceeding before the State Board 
of Medical Examiners, doctors accused of aiding, abetting, 
attempting, offering to procure, and performing criminal abor-
tions on named women on specified dates, are charged with 
crimes and should have the same opportunity as in criminal 
prosecutions to prepare their defense. 
[8] Administrative Law - Procedure - Production of Evidence-
Enforcement.-There is no administrative remedy for the 
err9neous denial of a subpoena before an administrative hear-
ing. 
[9] Id. - Procedure - Production of Evidence - Enforcement. -
An administrative agency can move to quash, vacate, or modify 
a subpoena in the superior court where the subject matter 
sought is privileged or the subpoena is too broad. 
[10] Id.-Procedure-Production of Evidence-Enforcement.-An 
administrative agency does not pass on the scope of its adver-
sary's subpoenas and need not assign hearing officers before 
hearings have actually begun. It is only at the hearing that the 
issuance of subpoenas is not mandatory, for a hearing officer is 
then present who can determine, after hearing both sides, 
whether a subpoena should issue. 
[11] Id.-Procedure-Production of Evidence.-To compel the pro. 
duction of items in connection with a hearing before an ad-
ministrative agency, it is nQt necessary that the items sought 
be admissible in evidence. 
[12] Id.-Procedure-Production of Evidence-Enforcement: Dis-
covery-Production of Documents-Showing Required.-When 
the subpoena power of an administrative agency is invoked to 
secure discovery, the good cause and materiality requirements 
of Code Civ. Proc., § 1985, must be governed by discovery 
standards. 
[8] See Oal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, § 156 • 
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[13] Discovery-Production of Documents: Physicians- Suspen-
sion and Revocation of Licenses-Proceedings.-Where the sec-
retary of the State Board of Medical Examiners filed accusa-
tions against. doctors stating that they aided, abetted, at-
tempted, offered to procure, and performed criminal abortions 
on named women on specified dates, the doctors were entitled 
to prehearing discovery of the statements of the women and 
their husbands and to production of such of the doctors' bills, 
letters and documents relating to the treatment given the 
women as may be in the possession of the board's agents. 
[14] Id.-Production of Documents-Showing Required: Physi-
cians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Proceedings. 
-To secure discovery of information in an adversary's files, 
there must be a showing of more than a wish for the benefit of 
all the information therein; and where, in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding, doctors were accused of aiding and performing crim-
inal abortions, they were not entitled to discover all reports 
and documents gathered by investigators and employees of the 
Board of Medical Examiners, absent some additional showing 
of need and specificity. Being entitled to a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make such a showing, they may invoke the subpoena 
power of Gov. Code, § 11510, to take depositions of the board's 
attorney and exe~cutive secretary 10 determine whether good 
cause exists for the production of other documents not priv-
ileged and not protected as an attorney's work product. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel issuance of sub-
poenas duces tecum to obtain depositions and documents from 
the Executive Secretary of the State Board of Medical Exam-
iners and from the board's attorney prior to disciplinary hear-
ings. Peremptory writ granted. 
Lamb & Glynn, Robert L. Lamb and Robert J. Glynn, Jr., 
for Petitioners. 
Zad Leavy and Herma Hill Kay as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Petitioners. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, E. G. Funke, Assistant 
Attorney General, Gerald F. Carreras, L. Stephen Porter, 
Warren H. Deering and Wiley W. Manuel, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respondent and Real Party in Interest. 
George R. Coan and Charles H. Bobby as Amici Curiae on 
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TRAYNOR, C, J.-Petitioners John P. Shively and Sey-
mour Smith, licensed physicians authorized to practice med-
icine and surgery in the State of California, brought this pro-
ceeding to compel issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to obtain 
depositions and documents from the Executive Secretary of 
the State Board of Medical Examiners and from the board's 
attorney prior to disciplinary hearings. 
On May 20, 1966, Wallace W. Thompson, executive secretary 
of the board, filed accusations against petitioners stating that 
they aided, abetted, attempted, offered to procure, and per-
formed criminal abortions on named women on specified dates. 
The accusations initiated disciplinary proceedings that could 
result in the revocation of petitioners' licenses to practice 
medicine (Bus, & Prof. Code, § 2360; Gov. Code, § 11503). 
Petitioners filed notices of defense and requested hearings. 
(Gov. Code, § 11506,) On June 6 the board set Dr. Shively'S 
hearing for July 25 and Dr. Smith's for July 27. (Gov. Code, 
§ 11509,) 
On June 27 petitioners presented four subpoenas duces 
tecum to respondent hearing officer requesting prehearing 
depositions and production of documents. By letter dated the 
same day, the hearing officer refused to sign the SUbpoenas. 
On june 30 petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandate 
in the superior court to compel issuance 0; the subpoenas, and 
on July 14 that court denied the petition. 
On July 22 petitioners filed a petition for an alternative 
writ of mandate and a restraining order in this court. We 
issued an alternative writ and stayed the administrative hear-
ings pending final disposition of the writ proceeding. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, §§ 11501-
11524), which was adopted in 1945 before pretrial discovery 
became a legal norm, cont.:'1.ins no express provisions authoriz-
ing prehearing discovery in administrative proceedings. (See 
generally Judicial Council of California, Tenth Biennial Re-
port (1944); Comment, Discovery Prior to Administrative 
Adjudications-A Statutory Proposal (1964) 52 Cal.L.Rev. 
823.) [1] Although section 11510 of the Government Code 
provides that "Before the hearing has commenced the agency 
or the assigned hearing officer shall issue subpoenas and sub-
poenas duces tecum at the request of any party ... " (subd. 
(a», section 11511 indicates that the Legislature expressly 
contemplated the use of the subpoena power to secure the 
attendance of witness('s and the production of evidence at 
hearings. [2] Thus, in authorizing the taking of depositions 
) 
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when the witness will be unable to or cannot be compelled to 
attend, section 11511 provides for depositions, not for the pur-
pose of discovery, but to secure evidence for use at the hear-
ing. 
[3] The Legislature's silence with respect to prehearing 
discovery in administrative proceedings does not mean, how-
ever, that it has rejected such discovery. Instead, as in the case 
of criminal discovery (see Jones v. Super·ior Court, 58 Ca1.2d 
56,58 [22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213], and 
cases cited), it has left to the courts the question whether 
modern concepts of administrative adjudication call for com-
mon law rules to permit and regulate the use of the agencies' 
subpoena power to secure prehearing discovery. 
Statutory administrative procedures have been augmented 
with common law rules whenever it appeared necessary to 
promote fair hearings and effective judicial review. In Fascina-
tion, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Ca1.2d 260 [246 P.2d 656], we con-
strued a statute requiring a licensing agency to "ascertain" 
facts to require the agency to give notice and hold a hearing. 
In English v. Oity 01 Long Beach, 35 Cal.2d 155 [217 P.2d 22, 
18 A.L.R.2d 547], we augmented the applicable st~tutory rules 
and required the agency involved to afford the! accused an 
opportunity to rebut ex parte evidence before it. In Brotsky v. 
State Bar, 57 Cal.2d 287 [19 Cal.Rptr. 153, 368 P.2d 697, 94 
A.L.R.2d 1310], we held that discovery was appropriate in 
state bar disciplinary proceedings. These cases illustrate Pro-
fessor Davis' observation that the law determining the ade-
quacy of administrative hearings ' 'is mostly judge-made 
law ... " and "the standards are essentially the same 
whether judges are giving content to due process, whether they 
are giving meaning to inexplicit statutory provisions, or 
whether they are developing a kind of common law." (Davis, 
1 Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 7.20, p. 506.) 
We need not recanvass the arguments for and against at-
trial and pretrial discQvery in civil and criminal cases. We are 
committed to the wisdom of discovery, by statute in civil cases 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016-2036), and by common law in crim-
inal cases. (Jones v. Superior Oourt, supra, 58 Cal.2d 56, 58, 
and cases cited.) The criminal law analogy is appropriate 
here. [4] The medical board has the resources of the state 
at its command to enable it to secure complete information and 
to prepare its case before filing an accusation. (Gov. Code, 
§§ 11180-11181.) Such investigatory powers have been libera11y 
construed. (Brovelli v. Superior Court, 56 Ca1.2d 524, 528-529 
) 
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[15 Cal. Rptr. 630, 364 P.2d 462] ; see Redding Pine Mills v .. ___ _ 
State Board of Equalizat'ion, 157 Cal.App.2d 40, 44 [320 P.2d 
25] ; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643 
[94 L.Ed. 401,70 S.Ct. 357].) [5] A disciplinary proceed-
ing has a punitive character, for the agency can prohibit an 
accused f:.;:om practicing his profession. (See Reich, The New 
Property (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733, 751-755, 781, 784.) 
[6] Since the agency is the accuser, a party to the proceed-
ing, and ultimately makes a decision on the record, its concen-
tration of functions calls for procedural safeguards. (Ibid., p. 
752, fn. 97.) [7] Petitioners have been charged with crimes 
and should have the same opportunity as in criminal prosecu-
tions to prepare their defense. (See Funk v. Superior Oourt, 
52 Ca1.2d 423, 424 [340 P.2d 593].) Moreover, when, as in this 
case, a busy professional board must be assembled to hear the 
charges, it is of the utmost importance that full preparation be 
promoted so that needless continuances can be avoided. 
The Attorney General contends that even if subpoenas duces 
tecum should have issued to compel prehearing production of 
documents and statements, the denial of the subpo~nas was an 
interlocutory decision of an administrative agency that cannot 
be reviewed until administrative remedies are exhausted. (See 
Abelleira v. District Oourt of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 292 [109' 
P.2d 942,.132 A.L.R. 715].) [8] There is no administrative 
remedy, however, for the erroneous denial of a subpoena before 
a hearing. Section 11510 of the Government Code provides 
that on proper application before the hearing subpoenas "shall 
issue, " and whether subpoenas are sought for the production 
of evidence at the hearing or to secure prehearing discovery, 
their issuance is a ministerial act with respect to which the 
agency or the hearing officer has no discretion. (Southern Pac. 
00. v. Superior Oourt, 15 Ca1.2d 206, 210 [100 P.2d 302, 130 
A.L.R. 323] ; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1986; Judicial Council of 
California, Tenth Biennial Report (1944) 17-18.) [9] The 
agency can move to quash, vacate, or modify the subpoena 
in the superior court if the subject matter is privileged 
or the subpoena is too broad. (Filipoff v. Superior Oourt, 
56 Ca1.2d 443, 452 [15 Cal.Rptr. 139, 364 P.2d 315].) 
[10] Thus, the agency does not pass on the scope of its 
adversary's subpoenas and need not assign hearing officers 
before hearings have actually begun. The procedure is similar 
to that set forth in Government Code sections 11187-11189, 
under which agencies must seek enforcement of their sub-
poenas in the superior court. It is only at the hearing that the 
issuance of subpoenas is not mandatory (National Auto. & 
) 
8 
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Ca.lf. Ins. Co. v. Garrison, 76 Cal.App.2d 415, 417 [173 P.2d 
67] ), for a hearing officer is then present who can determine 
after hearing both sides, whether or not a subpoena should 
issue. 
The Attorney General contends, however, that even if dis-
covery is proper, the subpoenas duces tecum requested are so 
broad that had they issued, they would be subject to a motion 
to quash or modify in the superior court. Normally a motion to 
quash or modify should be made in the superior court after 
the subpoenas h.ave issued. Since the entire case is now before 
us and the matter of the scope of the subpoenas has been fully 
briefed, no purpose but delay would be served by refusing to 
consider it. (See Hagan v. Superior Court, 53 Ca1.2d 498, 502 
[348 P.2d 896], and cases cited.) 
. Petitioners seek to subpoena (1) statements taken from the 
women named in the accusations describing their care and 
treatment and similar statements taken from their husbands; 
(2) copies of petitioners' bills, letters, and documents with 
respect to the treatment given the .. women; and ( 3) reports 
and documents gathered by investigators and employees of the 
board. In the affidavits in support of the subpoenas duces 
tecum, petitioners declare that at the hearing the mental and 
physical condition of the women, the intentions and acts of 
petitioners, lL"Qd the necessity of the surgical procedures will be 
in issue. They allege that all of the requested items will be 
. admiesible in evidance. 
:11] It is not llecessary that the items be admissible in 
~vidence to compel their production. [12] When the 
agency's subpoena power is invoked to secure discovery, the 
good cause and materiaiity requirements of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1985 must be governed by discovery standards. 
(Filipotl v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Ca1.2d 443, 449 [the 
court equated the requirements for issuance of subpoenas 
duces tecum with the requirements for motions for the produc-
tion and inspection of documents under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 2031] ; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 704, 
709 [312 P.2d 698] ; Funk v. Superior Court, supra, 52 Ca1.2d 
423.) In Funk we held that a defendant charged with criminal 
abortion was entitled to pretrial discovery of statements the 
alleged victims made to the police. [13] Petitioners are 
therefore clearly entitled to prehearing discovery of the state-
ments of the women and their husbands. Since petitioners also 
allege that they do not have copies of the bills, letters, and 
documentS referred to as item two, they are also entitled to 
IS C.Id-li 
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production of such of those documents as are in the possession 
of the board's agents. 
[14] With respect to item three, the applicable rule is that 
to secure discovery, there must be a showing of more than a 
wish for the benefit of all the information in the adversary's 
files. (See West Pieo Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 
2d 407, 419 [15 Cal.Rptr. 119, 364 P.2d 295]; People V.--~ 
Cooper, 53 Ca1.2d 755, 770 [3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964] ; 
Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Ca1.2d 159, 167-168 [49 Cal. 
Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838].) Accordingly, in the absence of some 
additional showing of need and specificity, petitioners are not 
entitled to discovery of all of the reports and documents 
gathered by investigators and employees of the board. Since 
petitioners are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to make 
such a showing, however, they may invoke the subpoena power 
of section 11510 of the Government Code to take depositions of 
the board's attorney and executive secretary to determine 
whether there is "good cause" for the production of other 
documents that are neither privileged nor protected as the 
attorney's work product. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. 
(b), § 2036, subd. (a); Union Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 151 
Cal.App.2d 286, 293 [311 P.2d 640].) 
Let.a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respond-
ent to isSue subpoenas duces tecum for the production of any 
statements made by women named in the accusations and their 
husbands, and copies of petitioners' bills, letters, 'and docu-
ments with respect to the treatment given the women. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Peek, J.," concurred. 
The petitions of the respondent and the real party in in-
terest for a rehearing were denied January 10, 1967. Sullivan, 
J., did not participate therein. 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under aBsip. 
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council 
